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Local Government Responsibility In Tort
In Louisiana
JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM* AND WILLIAM T. PEGUES**
The American perversion' of the, old English maxim that the
king can do no wrong is a conception of public irresponsibility
against which one's moral sense rebels. That government is above
the law is a notion that is hardly consistent with the doctrine of
supremacy of law which has so long been taken as a basic tenet
in our democrdtic faith. Yet the ancient immunity still obtains
in this state in all its vigor; there is no legal responsibility in
tort on the part of the state or the agencies of the state govern-
ment for injury to the person or damage to the property of the
individual citizen.2
$Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
" Member of the Louisiana bar.
1. Doubtless the most thorough study of the subject of "governmental
responsibility in tort" is to be found in the series of articles under substan-
tially that title, by Professor Borchard, which appeared in (1924-25) 84 Yale
L. J. 1, 129, 229 and (1926) 86 Yale I. J. 1. At 86 Yale L. J. 87 Borchard
sums the "king can do no wrong" business up as follows:
"The fact is that the unitary character of the sovereign in England, the
refusal since Coke's time to see in the king a dual personality, personal and
political and the refusal to regard the crown as a corporation, have brought
innumerable anomalies in the law governing remedies against the crown.
The imputation to the State in England of the infallibility of the personal
king, though without warrant in history or logic, can possibly be explained
on the evolutionary ground that the king did once dispense justice in person
and chose his own servants. Even this shadow of justification for an archaic
rule is inapplicable in the United States, where it nevertheless flourishes and
finds occasional support. Hardly a modern publicist or student of the subject
can now be found, however, who does not agree with Maitland's well-known
observations: '. . . it is a wholesome sight to see "the crown" sued and
answering for its torts.'"
2. Orgeron v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 19 La. App. 628, 140 So. 282
(1982), cert. denied May 23, 1932; Omes v. Department of Conservation of
Louisiana, 187 So. 842 (La. App. 1989); Lewis v. State, 200 So. 265 (La. 1941).
In the. Omea case the court made this astounding statement: "That the State
of Louisiana or a political subdivision thereof cannot be sued, ex delicto, does
not admit of argument." The reference to a political subdivision must have
been an inadvertence. A municipality is clearly such, yet, as we shall see,
there are many situations in which it may be sued ex delicto.
The courts have uniformly held that provision by statute that a state
department or agency shall have all rights, powers and immunities incident
to corporations or even that they may sue and be sued, does not amount to
legislative consent to actibns ex delicto brought by an employee or a third
person against such an arm of the state. For recent decisions, see Fouchaux
[ 720]
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It is a heartening circumstance that Judge Janvier of the
Orleans Court of Appeal recently reexamined the ancient doc-
trine in the light of modem governmental operations and found
it seriously wanting.3 He recognized that institutionalization of
the risk of injuries to the individual arising out of governmental
operations was more responsive to the social consciousness of
our day. And the fact that his court, not a tribunal of last resort,
felt compelled to follow the established rule of immunity in con-
sidering the case before it does not despoil his critique of vitality.
In the face of this immunity the injured party is left to such
remedies as the law may provide against the individual employee
or official at whose hands he sustained the injury. If the case
were one where he had been run down by the driver of a high-
way commission truck he would have the empty satisfaction of
knowing he could hold the truckdriver in damages for his negli-
gence; presumably the defendant would lack the requisite financi-
al responsibility to satisfy the judgment. In such a case the
legislature, out of the goodness of the hearts of the members,
might pass a special law pursuant to Section 35 of Article III
of the constitution authorizing the victim to bring an action
against the state and duly providing a method of procedure and
the effect of such a judgment as might be rendered in the action.
Once the victim obtained a judgment in the action, it may be
assumed, of course, that the legislature would in good faith
appropriate funds for its payment.
This, in brief, is the background of sovereign immunity in
the perspective of which we approach the subject of local gov-
ernment responsibility in tort.
In Louisiana, liability in tort can be imposed only where it is
expressly or impliedly authorized by the Civil Code or other
statutes of the state.4 The basic general principles of such liability
are embodied in codal articles as follows:
"Every act whatever of man that causes damages to an-
other, obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it....
v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New Orleans, 186 So. 103 (La. App. 1939).
affirmed on other grounds, 193 La. 182, 190 So. 373 (1939), cert. denied 308
U.S. 554, 60 S. Ct. 112, 84 L. Ed. 466 (1939); Omes v. Department of Conser-
vation of Louisiana, supra.
See generally Freund, Responsibility of the State in Internal (Municipal)
Law (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 1.
3. Orgeron v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 19 La. App. 628, 140 So. 282
(1932).
4. Semple v. Buhler, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 665 (La. 1828); Adams v. Golson, 187
La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937); Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460 (La. App. 1940), cert.
and review denied January 6, 1941.
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"Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions
not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence,
or his want of skill.
"We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned
by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of
persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which
we have in our custody .... 0,8
Very early in the history of our jurisprudence the supreme
court declared that private corporations, like natural persons,
were responsible in tort "for every injurious act on their part,
from which the law has not specially exempted them." It is to
be noted that the codal articles relating to corporations do not
make any distinction with respect to tort liability between a
municipal corporation and any other kind of corporate entity,
either political or civil,' nor is there anything in Article 2315 of
the Civil Code, or in its companion articles, which excepts any
political corporation from the general provisions making anyone,
liable for the results of his fault.8
Article 660 of the Civil Code, which relates to the servitude
due by a lower estate to receive the natural flow of waters from
the estate above, declares that the proprietor below may not
obstruct the natural flow and the proprietor above may not in-
crease the burden of the servitude. It is not without significance
that this article has been applied indiscriminately to private in-
dividuals and to local governmental units as proprietors.9 Article
2315 has been relied upon in awarding damages against a city
as a lower proprietor which had obstructed the natural drainage.10
In an old case involving the unlawful appropriation of an
5. Arts. 2315, 2316, 2317, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. Rabassa v. Orleans Navigation Co., 5 La. 461, 464 (1833).
7. Arts. 427-447, La. Civil Code of 1870.
8. Cf. Orgeron v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 19 La. App. 628, 140 So.
282 (1932). It is significant that in City of New Orleans v. Christmas, 17 Fed.
483 (E.D. La., 1883), reversed 131 U. S. 191, 9 S. Ct. 745, 33 L. Ed. 99 (1889),
the lower court held that Article 2815 of the Civil Code applied to municipal
corporations. The decision was reversed on other grounds by the Supreme
Court.
9. Bowman v. City of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 501 (1875); Petite Anse
Coteau Drainage Dist. v. Youngsville Drainage Dist. of Parish of Lafayette,
146 La. 161, 83 So. 445 (1919); Ogden v. Police Jury of East Baton Rouge
Parish, 166 La. 869, 118 So. 65 (1928); Chandler v. City of Shreveport, 169 La.
52, 124 So. 143 (1929); Adams v. Town of Ruston, 194 La. 403, 193 So. 688(1940) (The repeated reference In the opinion to Art. 600 of the Civil Code
was an Inadvertence because the context could relate only to Art. 660). Cf.
Thibodaux v. Town of Thibodeaux, 46 La. Ann. 1528, 16 So. 450 (1894).
10. Bowman v. City of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. (1875).
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individual's stone ballast for street purposes a city was held liable
in damages under the tort article of the Civil Code of 1825 cor-
responding to the present Article 2315.11
It appears that down to 1854 the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
in the negligence cases at least, did not distinguish between a
municipality and a private individual as a wrongdoer in applying
the basic principles of tort liability.12 The case of Stewart v. City
of New Orleans,13 decided in that year, marked the turning point
away from this wholesome rule. Without even mentioning the
earlier Louisiana cases, the majority opinion, largely in reliance
"upon a decision of a lower New York court, embraced the well-
known modern doctrine of municipal immunity where the injury
arose out of the performance of a governmental or public as dis-
tinguished from a so-called corporate or proprietary function of
the municipality.1 ' Of further significance, however, is the fact
that only two of the five judges of the Louisiana Supreme Court
11. Millspaugh v. City of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 323 (1868).
12. Mayor v. Peyroux, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 155 (La. 1827); Lambeth v. The
Mayor, 6 La. 731 (1834); M'Gary v. The President and Council of the City
of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 (La. 1846); 12 Rob. 674 (La. 1846); McGary v. The
City of Lafayette, 4 La. Ann. 440 (1849); Johnson v. Municipality No. One,
5 La. Ann. 100 (1850). Indeed, in one early case punitive damages were
awarded against the municipality. McGary v. The City -of Lafayette, 4 La.
Ann. 440, 441 (1849). Cf. Moore v. The Mayor of Shreveport, 3 La. 645 (1848).
13. 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854). In this case police officers of the city, acting
pursuant to orders to suppress unlawful assemblages of slaves in cabarets,
entered a dram shop in which plaintiff's slave was discovered, and, in
attempting to capture him, inflicted wounds that proved fatal. An action
for the value of the slave was brought against the city, but plaintiff's initial
success in the trial court proved abortive, for, on appeal, the supreme court
rendered Judgment for the city. Other early cases against the municipality
which at least smacked of tort involved the sufficiency of allegations in peti-
tions seeking recovery of the value of slaves whose loss was occasioned by
the negligence of municipal employees. The issues were decided upon prirt-
ciples governing the bailment relationship rather than upon those relating
to tort under the pertinent codal articles. Chase v. Mayor, 9 La. 343 (1836);
Clague v. City of New Orleans, 13 La. Ann. 275 (1858).
14. The distinction has been repudiated in South Carolina and Ohio but
the Ohio case has been overruled. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511,
72 S.E. 228, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 363 (1911); Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 100 Ohio
St. 158, 126 N.E. 72, 9 A.L.R. 131 (1919); and Aldrich v. City of Youngstown.
106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164, 27 A.L.R. 1497 (1922) (overruling the Fowler
case). In the Irvine case the court put the matter as follows:
"After much consideration of the authorities in this State and elsewhere
it seems to us the more logical conclusion that the Courts should not under-
take to say that any functions of a municipal corporation are private and
not governmental, but on the contrary should hold that municipal corpora-
tions are created solely for public and governmental purposes, and that all
powers granted to them by the General Assembly under the sanction of the
Constitution are to be exercised as public and governmental functions for
the benefit of the municipal community. Indeed this view of powers granted
is required by the definition of a municipality, for an essential part of the
definition is that the charter be granted for the purpose of subordinate self-
government." (89 S.C. at 518, 72 S.E. at 230, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) at 867.)
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concurred in the majority opinion. The third judge concurred
simply in the conclusion that the municipal government was not
liable in the case. Two judges dissented. Thus, the rationalization
of the result did not by the Stewart case become a part of the
jurisprudence of the state because it was not embraced by a ma-
jority of the court.
It was not until 1857 that what we take the liberty of calling
the governmental versus proprietary doctrine was approved by
a majority of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Lewis v. City
of New Orleans,' as the governing principle to be applied in de-
termining the tort liability of municipalities.
This qualified doctrine of immunity from tort liability had its
basis in the conception of a municipality as an arm of the state
government exercising portions of the powers of the sovereign
and thus sharing its immunity. The qualification comes about by
confining the immunity to what are considered the strictly gov-
ernmental functions of the municipality; only they reside under
the protecting mantle of sovereign immunity. What is striking
about this development, so far as Louisiana is concerned, is that
whereas in the common law states the distinction between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions was seized upon largely as
a means of limiting the field of immunity and correspondingly
expanding the field of liability, its introduction into Louisiana
worked just the other way. In Louisiana the doctrine of immun-
ity had not previously been recognized at all. It affords an in-
teresting instance of borrowing from a foreign legal system
which has proved to be retrogressive.
Today the principle of municipal immunity from liability is
said by one of the courts of appeal to be predicated upon a
public policy of not diverting public funds, dedicated for a
specific purpose, to the payment of damages for redress of in-
juries caused through the negligent performance of the public
function.'6 On the other hand, the following language from the
opinion in the recent case of Clinton v. City of West Monroe7
harks back to the old basis:
15. 12 La. Ann. 190 (1857).
16. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So. 132,
136 (La. App. 1936). The payment of a workman's compensation claim from
public funds of a parish school board has been held not to violate any con-
stitutional inhibitions against the diversion of public funds for private pur-
poses. Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938),
cert. and review denied August 5, 1938. The same view would appear to be
as eminently sound in the case of payment of a judgment for damages ex
delicto.
17. 187 So. 561, 564 (La. App. 1939), cert. and review denied March 6, 1931.
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"... when a municipality, the creature of the state exer-
cises powers and functions purely governmental in their
nature, it is simply discharging duties which inhere in and
are primarily incumbent upon the state. The municipality in
such circumstances, acts as the agent of the state, the repre-
sentative of sovereignty, and is immune from liability for
damages caused by its own public agents or servants."
It is an oft-repeated proposition in Louisiana jurisprudence
that municipal corporations are dual personalities leading double
lives. The notion is that, on the one hand, they perform functions
that are of a public or governmental nature and that, on the
other hand, they carry on so-called private, proprietary or cor-
porate functions. It is only as Dr. Jekyll that they enjoy sovereign
immunity.
It may be profitable to dip into the cases before examining
these theories critically.
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Governmental Functions
The governmental-function immunity has been extended in
this state to police activities,"8 to such matters as the operation of
an elevator in a municipal criminal court building,19 to the opera-
tion of a free garbage collection service,2 0 to the operation and
maintenance of public parks,2' swimming pools, 22 and school sys-
18. Stewart v. City of New Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854) (unlawful killing
by police of slave attempting to escape arrest); Lewis v. City of New Orleans,
12 La. Ann. 190 (1857) (neglect of city jail keeper to care for imprisoned
slave, resulting in latter's death); City of New Orleans v. Kerr, 50 La. Ann.
413, 23 So. 384 (1898) (illegal arrest and imprisonment by police); Jones v.
City of New Orleans, 143 La. 1073, 79 So. 865 (1918) (unlawful killing of a
person attempting to escape arrest, by city policemen assigned to special
duty with city's railway system); Joliff v. City of Shreveport, 144 La. 62, 80
So. 200 (1918) (unlawful raid on a private establishment by city police while
"apparently acting in the discharge of their duties"). See Martin v. Magee,
179 La. 913, 919, 155 So. 433, 434 (1934).
19. Howard v. City of New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443 (1925).
20. Manguno v. City of New Orleans, 155 So. 41 (La. App. 1934), wherein
the action arose out of an accident caused by the uncoupling of a trailer
attached to a garbage truck being operated by the city's employee within the
scope of his employment. The responsibility of a city to a lessor for the
care of property used in garbage removal is on a different footing, however.
A city has been held liable for damage to such property due to the negli-
gence of its employees. Interstate Transp. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 52
La. Ann. 1859, 28 So. 310 (1900).
21. Godfrey v. City of Shreveport, 6 La. App. 356 (1927), involving an
action seeking damages for injuries caused when a child used a defective
slide in a city park; Loustalot v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n,
164 So. 183 (La. App. 1935), involving an attempt to recover damages for
injuries caused by a falling pole which was being used in a May Day balloon
ascension sponsored by the city park association with admission free.
22. See Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 So.
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tems not operated for pecuniary profit or gain,2 8 and to the illegal
enforcement of police regulations, as, for instance, an ordinance
for the impounding of an automobile improperly parked on a
street.2 '
In principle it would seem that the immunity would extend
to the activities of a municipal fire department. Nevertheless,
liability was imposed, apparently under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, in a case where a pedestrian was injured when
knocked down on the sidewalk by a team of untrained horses
hitched to a fire engine.25 But the supreme court has indicated
that it does not consider this decision a precedent on the point.26
tfnder the general rule that a municipal corporation is not
liable for the torts of its employees while in the exercise of a
so-called governmental function, municipalities in Louisiana are
not subjected to liability for personal injuries or death caused by
mob action where there is a refusal or neglect of municipal offi-
cers to perform their legal duties to maintain order. Thus, where
a town marshall refused or failed to protect private property
from mob action after the owner's request, which resulted in the
owner's death in an attempt to defend it, an exception of no
cause of action was sustained as to the marshall and the town
132, 136 (La. App. 1936), involving the death of a child allegedly caused by
the negligent operation of a municipal swimming pool which, it was held,
was not operated for profit, a small fee being charged as merely incidental
to maintenance.
23. Floyes v. City of Monroe, 194 So. 102 (La. App. 1940), involving a
situation where a student was injured as a result of falling into a depression
in front of a water cut-off box on the campus of a public school operated
and maintained by the city.
24. Roach v. City of Shreveport, 8 La. App. 339 (1928).
A city ordinance authorized the city commissioner of public works to
notify the owner of a burned building to demolish it as a requirement of
public safety. The court held that the failure of the commissioner to give
notice did not render the city liable because (1) the ordinance did not require
notice to be given, and (2) the failure and neglect to give notice was not
the proximate cause of the injury as demolition of the building was in
progress at the time of the accident and the falling of the cornice resulted
from the condition of partial demolition rather than from the fire. The gov-
ernmental function argument was 'not mentioned, although it is difficult to
think of any case where it would more clearly apply; enforcement of regu-
lations ordained under the police power is plainly governmental business.
Marshall v. Louisiana Rice Milling Co., 144 La. 828, 81 So. 331 (1918).
25. Martin v. Board of Fire Com'rs for City of New Orleans, 132 La. 188,
61 So. 197 (193-). Cf. Yule v. City of New Orleans, 25 La. Ann. 394 (1873),
involving an action ex contractu growing out of loss by fire.
26. Howard v. City of New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 448, 105 So. 443, 445
(1925). The failure to provide water for fire protection has been shielded,
by the governmpntal function label. See Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Water-
works and Light Co., 52 La. Ann. 1243, 27 So. 684 (1900). See also Allen &
Currey Mfg. Co., Ltd. v. Shreveport Waterworks Co., 113 La. 1091, 37 So.
980 (1904), overruling the Planters' case on a separate point.
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in reliance on the governmental function notion.Y Likewise it has
been held that an action was not maintainable under Article
2315 of the Civil Code for alleged wrongful death by a member
of a mob as a result of the negligence of city police.2 8 It has also
been held that no action lay against the mayor and councilmen
of a city individually for injuries inflicted by a mob where it was
not alleged that they were present, aiding and abetting the mob,
or that they or either of them inflicted the wounds.2'
It has been stated that, in the absence of statute, there can
be no municipal liability for the destruction of private property
by mobs since the duty to preserve order is a governmental one.80
But in this jurisdiction there has long been a statutory qualifica-
tion of the immunity doctrine in this type of case. The statute so
far breaks down the immunity as to provide for liability by the
"different municipal corporations of this state ... for the damages
done to property by mobs or riotous assemblages in their respec-
tive limits."81 The statute has been held inapplicable to parishes.82
A municipality legally divested of the control and management
of its police force has been held liable under the statute.88
It is clear from the language of this old statute that it does
not apply to personal injuries, and under the decisions on the
subject, it will be seen that the usual immunity with respect to
police action or inaction is extended to the case where one is
injured or killed by a mob. Thus, we have the bizarre situation
of municipal immunity where the very life of a citizen is in-
volved, but municipal liability where his hen-house or any other
property has been damaged. Surely direct human,values should
not be so lightly regarded.8"
27. Rush v. Town of Farmerville, 156 La. 857, 101 So. 243 (1924).
28. Gianforte v. City of New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64, 24 L.R.A. 592 (ED. La.,
1894); City of New Orleans v. Abbagnato, 62 Fed. 240 (C.C.A. 5th, 1894).
29. Spalding v. Kreider, 26 La. Ann. 743 (1874).
30. Glanforte v. City of New Orleans, 61 Fed. 64, 24 L.R.A. 592 (ED. La.,
1894).
31. La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2453 [Dart's Stats. (1989) § 5369].
32. Fischer Land & Improvement Co. v. Bordelon, 52 La. Ann. 429, 27 So.
59 (1899).
33. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 23 La. Ann. 507 (1871). Cf. Street v.
City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 577 (1880). In 1874, citizens had for a brief
period wrested the reins of state and city government from a carpetbag
regime and had done considerable damage to private property in the process.
The court refused to label them a mob or riotous assembly and thus to hold
the city of New Orleans liable.
34. As to ascertainment and mitigation of damages under the statute,
see Fortunich v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. Ann. 115 (1859); Fink v. City
of New Orleans, 110 La. 84, 34 So. 138 (1903).
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Proprietary or Corporate Functions
Louisiana adheres to the generally approved corollary doc-
trine that municipal corporations in the performance of what are
determined to be corporate, private or proprietary functions, as
distinguished from governmental activities, are liable in tort sub-
stantially on the same basis as private parties engaged in like
functions or pursuits. Among municipal functions characterized
as corporate or proprietary, are the ownership and operation of
public utilities. Within this class fall electric systems,35 natural
gas distribution systems36 and transportation systems. 7
Without any reference to the governmental versus proprie-
tary test, it has been held that a petition alleging, in brief, that
sewage from a municipal sewerage system was forced back by
some unknown cause through the sanitary facilities on plaintiff's
premises with damaging results, despite clever mechanical
gadgets installed by him to cope with the problem, stated a cause
of action. 8 The court invoked res ipsa loquitur. In another case
judgment was recovered for personal injuries resulting from
negligence of the New Orleans sewerage and water board in con-
nection with the construction of one of its projects.39 It does not
appear from the report of the case what the nature of the work
being done was, that is, whether it related to sewer lines or to
35. Bonnin v. Town of Crowley, 112 La. 1025, 36 So. 842 (1904); Borrell
v. Cumberland Telegraph and Telephone Co., 133 La. 630, 63 So. 247 (1913);
Elias v. Mayor and Board of Trustees of City of New Iberia, 137 La. 691, 69
So. 141 (1915); Bannister v. City of Monroe, 4 La. App. 182 (1926); Hart v.
Town of Lake Providence, 5 La. App. 294 (1927); Lawn v. City of Monroe,
8 La. App. 541 (1928); Oliphant v. Town of Lake Providence, 193 La. 675, 192
So. 95 (1939). No point has been made in these cases of the purpose for
which electricity was being supplied. We think the purpose immaterial but
there are cases elsewhere in which the function of providing electricity for
municipal buildings or public places, as distinguished from serving private
consumers, was deemed immune. See Borchard, supra note 1, at 34 Yale
L.J. 253, n. 330.
36. Phillips v. City of Alexandria, 11 La. App. 228, 123 So. 510 (1929).
37. Davis v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419, 31
A.L.R. 1303 (1924); Solomon v. City of New Orleans, 156 La. 629, 101 So. 1
(1924); Mask v. City of Monroe, 9 La. App. 431, 121 So. 250 (1928), holding
city liable for personal injuries and damages to automobile by city-operated
bus; Young v. City of New Orleans, 14 La. App. 306, 129 So. 247 (1930),
applying last clear chance doctrine although not discussing nature of city's
function in operating railrcad; Johnson v. City of Monroe, 164 So. 456 (La.
App. 1935).
38. Urban Land Co. v. City of Shreveport, 182 La. 978, 162 So. 747 (1935).
It should be noted that the court held, in effect, that plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged negligence in the operation of the system for it expressed approval of
the conventional formula tLhat a municipality is liable for damages arising
out of negligent operation of a sewerage system but not for those occa-
sioned by any defect or inadequacy in the plan or construction of the system.
39. Quayle v. Sewerage and Water Board, 131 La. 26, 58 So. 1021 (19121
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water mains, for example. Whether a sewerage system is a public
utility or not, that the immunity principle should not be applied
to its operation seems clear enough.
The power of a city to provide a supply of water has been
labeled legislative and governmental in a case where recovery
for the amount of a fire loss allegedly due to an inadequate water
supply was denied. But there the city did not have a water system
of its own; it had contracted with a private company for a water
supply and, notwithstanding the broad language used, the court
may yet come along and say that a water supply for one purpose,
such as fire protection, is governmental, whereas, for another,
such as domestic use, it is corporate.40 We hope not. We think
that a municipal water supply for any purpose is public business.
We simply do not regard "public business" as synonymous with
"irresponsibility."
The pragmatist who frowns upon the immunity rule, no
doubt would get unmixed satisfaction from the judicial resort to
the factor of operation for a profit as a device by which to make
further incursions into the domain of immunity. But it has ad-
ditional significance; it holds up before the light the flimsy tex-
ture of the whole governmental versus proprietary business.
The fruits of the device readily appear. As we have seen, ordi-
nary park operation is deemed governmental, but enter the profit
factor, as in the case of operation of a golf course or a swimming
pool on a fee basis and, presto, the city has gone into business
with at least the attendant risk of tort liability."1
The Rationale of the Distinction
If the test of immunity is the character of the function, how
40. Planters' Oil Mill v. Monroe Waterworks and Light Co., 52 La. Ann.
1243, 27 So. 684 (1900). For discussions of decisions in other states see Bor-
chard, supra note 1, at 34 Yale L.J. 254, and 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions (Rev. ed. 1937) § 2852.
41. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 156 So. 64
(La. App. 1934), affirmed 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121 (1935), reversing 157 So. 175
(La. App. 1934); Brooks v. Bass, 184 So. 222 (La. App. 1938).
To state a cause of action against a municipality it has been said that,
in addition to alleging municipal operation of an enterprise and the negli-
gence of its employees which caused injury, facts making out the following
essentials of liability must be specifically pleaded: (1) that the defendant
is a municipality, (2) that the municipality had authority to do the act,
(3) that the agent or employee was exercising a legitimate corporate duty,
and (4) that the act was not one in the performance of a governmental
function. West Monroe Mfg. Co. v. Town of West Monroe, 146 La. 641, 83
So. 881 (1920). But see Tiller v. City of Monroe, 5 La. App. 473 (1927), hold-
ing it unnecessary to allege that the defendant is a municipal corporation
on the theory that the court should take judicial notice of its corporate
existence where it was designated by its proper name.
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can it be that the profit factor makes any difference? Does it
automatically convert the function into semi-private business? It
is true that the profit to be derived from a light or water system
may be an important matter to a given municipality, but the
fact still remains that the prime objective of the system is to
supply the people with electricity or water. Any net return is
incidental. The legislature, moreover, could require that munici-
pal utilities be operated at cost. From the standpoint of tort lia-
bility, that is, the problem of who shall bear the risk of the con-
duct of such a business or activity, are we to be told that the
wiping out of the profit element should also obliterate responsi-
bility on the part of the municipality in tort?
That there is nothing ultimate about the distinction between
the governmental and proprietary functions of a municipality is
indicated by the fact that a given function may be deemed pro-
prietary for purposes of tort law and governmental for other
purposes. Not long before the Supreme Court of the United
States broke down completely the notion that the salaries of
officials and employees of the state and local governments were
immune from federal taxation, that Court used the governmental
versus proprietary distinction in determining whether the salary
of the chief engineer of the Bureau of Water Supply of New
York City was subject to federal income taxation. The Court
found that the city was engaged in a governmental function even
though it sold water for a profit and proceeded to hold that the
ancient doctrine of intergovernmental immunity from taxation
applied. 42
Students of local government are becoming more acutely
aware that most of the things that a municipality does may prop-
erly be described indiscriminately as public services rendered
the community, some of which are financed by tax moneys and
some in other ways. The significant fact is that the given activity
is engaged in on a public basis as distinguished from private en-
terprise. We must, of course, have first satisfied ourselves that the
field is one that government constitutionally may enter. Today
there are legitimate and occupied fields of governmental activity
hardly dreamed of a generation ago. So far as local government,
at least, is concerned, this expansion is responsive to a popular
demand for more and better public services.
When we approach the matter from this angle our perspective
42. Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U.S. 352, 57 S. Ct.
495, 81 L. Ed. 691 (1937).
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should be clearer; it should be easier to see that an attempt to
classify the functions of government according to some a priori
notion embodying such an assumption as that all functions of
government are inherently either governmental or proprietary,
for purposes of determining who shall bear the risk of injuries to
persons and damage to property arising out of the conduct of
such functions, is a highly artificial business. It still remains to
be demonstrated just what that highly vulnerable distinction has
to do with the basic problem of who should bear the risk of the
manifold activities of government so far as responsibility for
ordinary civil wrongs in concerned.
Street and Sidewalk Cases
There is one important field of municipal activity in which,
for purposes of determining tort liability, the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions has broken down. It is
.evident that if the distinction means anything, the function of
providing and: maintaining streets and sidewalks is to be re-
garded as governmental. It is equally evident, on the other hand,
that the risk of municipal dereliction should be borne by the
municipality rather than the individual. The public ways are
strictly under the control of the public authorities. The individual
obviously has no adequate means of self-help. Yet the use of the
streets and sidewalks and other public ways is indispensable to
the daily conduct of his affairs. For a municipality to have ex-
clusive authority without anything approaching commensurate
responsibility in a matter so important to the wellbeing of the
members of the public would be monstrous. There is little won-
der, then, that the courts of the state have refused to cloak this
function with the pallium of sovereign immunity.' 8
In an early case the supreme court expressed doubt that an
action could be maintained against a municipality grounded upon
43. The necessity for this exception to the general rule was stated by
the Court of Appeal of the Second Circuit in Clinton v. City of West Monroe,
187 So. 561, 564 (La. App. 1939), in the following language:
"But the rule, strict as it is, has in this state at least one exception. A
municipality may be held in damages to those injured because of its failure
to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel.
If this were not true, persons, who desire to use such streets and sidewalks
could never safely assume that they are in such condition to warrant travel
thereon. If so used, they would have to keep their eyes constantly glued
on the surface before them and at night carry a lighted lamp for protection
against injury. Holes, pits and excavations in the streets or' sidewalks could
be left by the agents or servants of the municipality, resulting in death or
severe bodily injury to its citizens, with no recourse for damages by any-
one, but for the exception to the rule now so well recognized in this state.
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injuries caused by the negligence of the municipality in obstruct-
ing a street in the absence of statutory authority or of juris-
prudence sustaining a rule of municipal responsibility. The court
wad under the impression that in other states where such a cause
of action was recognized the improvement in the law was
achieved by express statutory provision." This impression was
not entirely well founded. In New York, for example, it had pre-
viously been held that the City of New York was responsible in
damages for injury to abutting property where its failure to keep
culverts and storm sewers in good condition and unobstructed
resulted in a damaging overflow. There was no express statutory
provision for civil liability; there was simply a statute, permis-
sive in terms, authorizing the construction, maintenance, and
repair of culverts and sewers. In order to make out a duty to
the owner 6f the abutting property, the court seized upon the
well-known rule of interpretation that "may" means "must"
where the public interest or the rights of third parties require
such an interpretation of the statute.45
In some of the earlier cases liability was based upon a charter
requirement that the given municipality maintain its streets and
sidewalks in good repair. It was assumed, without elucidation,
that the governmental duty imposed by charter amounted, in
addition, to a civil duty to individuals using the public ways of
the municipality. Thus in O'Niell v. City of New Orleans,46 the
court was content to refer simply to the duty imposed by charter
to keep the streets of the city in repair. But even in this relatively
early case the court began to break down the notion that the
44. Moore v. the Mayor of Shreveport, 3 La. Ann. 645 (1848).
45. Mayor of tha City of New York v. Furze, 3 Hill 612 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1842). It should be noted that in 1856 the Court of Appeal of New York
shifted to a different theory of civil liability because it thought that the
Purze case established too broad a principle. It was not prepared to concede
that the neglect of a public duty would necessarily entail civil liability to
affected private parties. So it worked out the ingenious, but unconvincing,
theory that there was anjmtplied undertaking on the part of the munici-
pality to keep public wayslin repair which was exacted by the sovereign
&s a condition upon and 1 coasideration of which corporate capacity and
powers were conferred by the:sovereign. The implied undertaking would
inure to the, benefit of any party interested in its performance. Weet v.
Trustees of the Village of Brockport, 16 N.Y. 161n. (Sup. Ct. 1856). The
reasoning of the coui-t in this case was fallacious because there is in point
of law no reciprocity of stipulation in the chartering of municipal corpora-
tions. Under the prevailing doctrine of legislative supremacy a legislaturd
may create a municipality regardless of local approval or consent; accept-
ance of a municipal charter is not legally necessary. Nevertheless, this New
York theory has been embraced in other jurisdictions. See, for example,
Wilson v. City of Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 823, 881 (1882).
46. S0 La. Ann. 220, 31 Am. Rep. 221 (1878).
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basis for civil liability was the charter duty to repair. The court
was at pains to make it clear that the liability of the city was
not that of an insurer; that its liability depended upon fault, or,
in other words, in the ordinary case upon negligence. This is
significant because the statutory duty is unqualified; the statute
does not say, for example, that a city must repair its streets only
if it knows or should know of the state of disrepair. Theoretically
the court might have attached the additional qualification that
the municipality must have been given the legal means, by tax-
ation or otherwise, to perform the duty.47 The qualification would
not be important because legal authority and means (as distin-
guished from actual economic resources) are a commonplace
statutory concomitant of the grant of authority with respect to
public ways.
While there are several fairly recent cases in which reliance
was placed upon a mandatory charter duty to repair, it is quite
clear from the cases that the rule of liability obtains today with-
out regard to the existence of such a statutory duty. Thus, in the
leading case of Lemoine v. City of Alexandria,'4 the rule of re-
sponsibility in this type of situation was laid down broadly with-
out reference to any express charter duty.
The duty of a municipality to pedestrians or other travelers
upon its sidewalks or streets has been repeatedly stated to be a
duty to exercise reasonable care to keep its streets and sidewalks
in such condition that travelers who are prudent and ordinarily
careful will not be exposed to injury, day or night.4 9 Taken at
first glance this statement suggests that in order to make out a
breach of duty on the part of the defendant a plaintiff must allegd
and prove, among other things, facts making out the exercise of
prudence and ordinary care on his part. But the matter has not
been worked out in that way. The Louisiana courts are committed
to the proposition that contributory negligence is an affirmative
defense.50 This being the case, the formulation which qualifies the
duty of the municipality in terms of the care exercised by the
47. The point was discussed in Cline v. Crescent City R.R., 41 La. Ann.
1031, 6 So. 851 (1889), but not passed upon since the case went off upon a
procedural matter. It is significant that in the leading English case, Russell
v. Men of Devon, 2 Term R. 667, 100 Eng. Reprint 359 (1788), the defendant
was an unincorporated county which had no corporate treasury and, appar-
ently no legal means of raising funds. That was a case in which the injuries
were due to a defective bridge. Recovery was denied.
48. 151 La. 562, 92 So. 58 (1922).
49. See, for example, Goodwyn v. City of Shreveport, 134 La. 820, 64 S6.
762 (1914) and Suthon v. City of Houma, 146 So. 515 (La. App. 1933).
50. Buechner v. City of New Orleans, 112 La. 599, 36 So. 603 (1904).
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traveler has little if any practical significance. In actual admin-
istration contributory negligence is a good affirmative defense
just as in cases between private parties, but the injured party
may make out a prima facie case regardless of the element of
contributory negligence.
Beyond what has already been said, generalization grows
hazardous. But it would not do to say that the jurisprudence has
not packed content into the subject. It is sufficiently clear from
the cases that, in order to make out a cause of action, at least the
following elements must be present: (1) the condition which
caused the injury must have been dangerous or calculated to do
injury and (2) the municipality must have had actual notice of
the condition or its existence have continued over a period and
under such circumstances that in the exercise of due diligence
the municipality would have had notice of the situation.in time
to correct it. A few illustrations from the cases may be helpful.
On the one hand, classification as a dangerous condition has
been judicially accorded a protruding metal edging of a side-
walk curbing,'1 a misplaced flagstone crossing over a street cul
vert,"2 a decayed culvert over a public fire well in a street,58 an
obstruction on a sidewalk in the form of a stepping stone put
there by a paving contractor," a wire rope strung above and
along the edge of a sidewalk to keep back Mardi Gras crowds 5 5 a
decayed or missing plank in a wooden bridge across a gutter3
an abrupt variation of five inches in the level of a sidewalk in
front of two adjoining properties,'7 an open cutoff pipe or box
in a sidewalk,5 8 a defective shoulder or support on which rested
the cover over a street drain,5 9 an unbridged and unguarded
canal or ditch across a streetG a break in a cement sidewalk an
inch and a half deep and fourteen or more inches wide, 1 an in-
51. Miller v. City of New Orleans, 152 So. 141 (La. App. 1934); Parker v.
City of New Orleans, 1 So. (2d) 123 (La. App. 1941).
52. O'Niell v. City of New Orleans, 30 La. Ann. 220, 31 Am. Rep. 221
(1878).
53. Lorenz v. City of New Orleans, 114 La. 802, 38 So. 566 (1905).
54. McCormack v. Robin, 126 La. 594, 52 So. 779 (1910).
55. Nessen v. City of New Orleans, 134 La. 455, 64 So. 286 (1914).
56. Weinhardt v. City of New Orleans, 125 La. 851, 51 So. 286 (1910);
Smith v. City of New Orleans, 135 La. 980, 66 So. 819 (1914).
57. Blume v. City of New Orleans, 104 La. 345, 29 So. 106 (1900); Labarre
v. City of New Orleans, 106 La. 458, 30 So. 891 (1901).
58. Lemoine v. City of Alexandria, 151 La. 562, 92 So. 58 (1922).
59. Geismar v. City of Alexandria, 142 So. 367 (La. App. 1932).
60. General Securities Co., Inc. v. City of Hammond, 11 La. App. 306,
123 So. 399 (1929); Clinton v. City of West Monroe, 187 So. 561 (La. App.
1939), discussed in Note (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 132.
61. Robinson v. City of Alexandria, 174 So. 681 (La. App. 1987).
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adequately guarded excavation left in a street,0 2 and a decayed
wooden culvert under a grade crossing." On the other hand, an
unpaved street, 4 a sloping variation of one and one-half inches
in the level of a paved sidewalk in front of two adjoining prop-
erties,65 an abrupt variation of two or three inches in the level of
a paved sidewalk," a manhole cover worn smooth by traffic," a
three-inch stopcock pipe protruding a fraction of an inch above
the sidewalk,6 8 an uneven sidewalk due to soil erosion or other
natural causes,69 and a hole in a cement sidewalk about four
inches deep and about a foot squareTO have been treated as con-
ditions that were not dangerous.
We are not particularly concerned with resolving the appar-
ent inconsistencies in some of the cases cited. Some may consti-
tute mere vagaries in judicial administration but we must re-
member that each tort case, to a degree unequalled in most
branches of the law, is sui generis. If this is so, may we not sup-
pose that the cases serve to illustrate the flexibility needed to
enable a court to mold its decisions to the more or less inarticu-
late conceptions of justice so important in the decisions of tort
cases. However, we add-quite cautiously, it is true-the observa-
tion that one seems to discern a tendency in the recent court of
appeals cases to resolve doubts as to whether a given situation
involves a dangerous condition in favor of the municipality.
In at least one jurisdiction municipalities and counties have,
by statute, been made insurers of the safe condition of the streets,
sidewalks and bridges.71 This drastic standard of responsibility is
to be contrasted with the conception of fault on which the Louis-
62. Allen v. Town of Minden, 127 La. 403, 58 So. 666 (1910); Holden v.
Toye Brothers Auto and Taxicab Co., Inc., 1 La. App. 521 (1925).
63. Tharpe v. Sibley Lake Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144 So. 274 (La.
App. 1932).
64. MiUstead v. City of New Orleans, 146 So. 492 (La. App. 1933).
65. Goodwyn v. City of Shreveport, 134 La. 820, 64 So. 762 (1914).
66. Brown v. City of New Orleans, 7 La. App. 611 (1927); Suthon v. City
of Houma, 146 So. 515 (IA. App. 1933); Loucks v. City of Crowley, 185 So.
648 (La. App. 1939). In the cane of Carsey v. City of New Orleans, 181 so'.
819 (La. App. 1938), soil erosion had caused an unevenness in a sidewalk
resulting in a five and one-half inch elevation of one of the concrete slabs
over the next. The court said that this was not such a dangerous condition
as to warrant a finding that the city was guilty of negligence in failing to
repair it "particularly in view of the fact that it did not have actual knowl-
edge of its existence."
67. Linxwiler v. City Of Shreveport, 151 So. 81 (La. App. 1933).
68. Burns v. City of New Orleans, 155 So. 61 (La. App. 1934).
69. Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 191 So. 734 (La. App. 1939).
70. Wiltz" v. City of New Orleans, 2 La. App. 444 (1925).
71. See W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) 1 1588 and Price, Gov-
ernnental Liability for Tort in Went Virginia (1932) 38 V. Va. L. Q. 101, 110.
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iana jurisprudence is built. The contrast is made conspicuous by
the Louisiana rule that a municipality must have had actual notice
of the condition which caused the injury or its existence have
continued over such a period and under such circumstances that
in the exercise of due diligence it would have had notice of the
situation in time to correct it. While there is some language in
the opinions suggestive of a general requirement that in order to
make out a breach of duty by the municipality the dangerous
condition must have been of such a character .as to make it ap-
parent to one engaged in the exercise of ordinary care,7 2 it seems
clear that this conception carries entirely too far; there is no
reason why a municipality should not be held in the case of a
latent defect if it had actual notice in time to do something about
the matter. It has been judicially stated, moreover, that the
municipality must have had or been chargeable with notice for.
a sufficient period in advance of the accident to enable it to make
the necessary repairs.78 This statement is entirely too broad be-
cause it may take time to effect needed repairs, yet there is no
reason why the public should not be safeguarded in the mean-
time by the use of appropriate barriers, warning signs, anc4 the
like.
Broadly speaking, a municipality will not be regarded as
having received notice unless an official charged with the re-
sponsibility in the matter of street and sidewalk maintenance or
a subordinate charged with the responsibility of reporting street
and sidewalk defects receives the notice. Thus it is deemed
enough if a member of the city council has notice since he has
a responsibility in the matter.7 4 In a case where the city electri-
cian had been notified of the existence in the edge of a road of the
stump of a broken off lamp post, knowledge was imputed to the
city.7 5 On the other hand, the knowledge of a policeman who was
not charged with the duty of reporting conditions of disrepair in
sidewalks and streets has been held not to be notice to the munic-
ipality. 6
72. See Miller v. City of New Orleans, 152 So. 141, 142 (La. App. 1934).
73. Ibid.
74. Weinhardt v. City of New Orleans, 125 La. 351, 51 So. 286 (1910). In
Miller v. City of New Orleans, 152 So. 141 (La. App. 1934), notice by tele-
phone to an employee in the office of the department having jurisdiction
was deemed enough. See also O'Niell v. City of New Orleans, 30 La. Ann.
220, 31 Am. Rep. 221 (1878). Query-where the employee gets notice when
he is off duty.
75. Landry v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 149 So. 136 (La. App.
1933).
76. Collins v. Lyons, 9 La. App. 736, 120 So. 418 (1929). Cf. Wiltz v. City
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Actual notice is not essential where the condition was such
that had due care been exercised on the part of the municipality
it would have known of the danger in time to remove or guard
against it. It is the vogue to refer to this type of situation as one
involving constructive or implied notice.7 It would seem to be a
clearer and more direct statement of the matter, however, to de-
part from the language of notice and simply to declare that in
such a situation there may be a breach of duty to the traveler
without notice. It is with respect to this type of case that the
notion, that the defect must be of a character that our estimable
friend, the man of ordinary prudence who is wont to use reason-
able care, would readily observe, comes into play. We are talking
about civil responsibility based on negligence and it would not
harmonize with the idea of fault to hold a municipality in the ab-
sence of actual notice where conditions were not such as that
competent inspection, for example, would disclose the danger.
How long the dangerous condition must have existed to make out
negligence on the part of the municipality on this basis is a matter
of time and circumstance. In a case where a signpost used to
designate parking limits had fallen onto the sidewalk in the heart
of the business district in the City of Monroe and had been there
in one position or another for a month, the court of appeal was
satisfied that the city was negligent in not discovering and rem-
edying the situation.78 In most of the cases involving this point,
however, the period was much longer.79
While our courts have not been prepared, in the street and
of New Orleans, 2 La. App. 444 (1925), in which the court observed that it
was the duty of a New Orleans policeman to report defective sidewalks.
77. See Tharpe v. Sibley Lake Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144 So. 274 (La.
App. 1932); Parker v. City of New Orleans, 1 So. (2d) 123 (La. App. 1941).
78. Tiller v. City of Monroe, 5 La. App. 473 (1927); Parker v. City of New
Orleans, 1 So. (2d) 123 (La. App. 1941) (involved a period of about two
months).
79. Lorenz v. City of New Orleans, 114 La. 802, 38 So. 566 (1905) (condi-
tion "visibly existed for several months" before accident); Smith v, City of
New Orleans, 135 La. 980, 66 So. 319 (1914) (hole in gutter crossing had been
"visible for months"); Tharpe v. Sibley Lake Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144
So. 274 (La. App. 1932) (constructive notice -. rotten wooden culvert at street
and railroad track intersection which had not been inspected for a year or
more); Kernstock v. City of New Orleans, 147 So. 371 (La. App. 1933) (con-
structive notice from what an inspection actually made should have dis-
closed); Nuss v. City of New Orleans, 147 So. 374 (La. App. 1933) (same);
Holbrook v. City of Monroe, 157 So. 566 (La. App. 1934) (constructive notice
where defect had existed for "several years"); Hebert v. City of New
Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La. App. 1935) (constructive notice from what an inspec-
tion actually made should have disclosed); Robinson v. City of Alexandria,
174 So. 681 (La. App. 1937) (constructive notice where defect in sidewalk
existed for "ten years").
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sidewalk cases, to lay it down flatly that there is a duty to in-
spect, 0 it is manifest that a municipality cannot obviate the risk
of civil liability in this field of municipal administration short of
systematic inspection. The deterring force of the rule of civil
responsibility in these cases is inadequate unless it does impel
inspection. We fear that it has fallen short of the objective of the
law in this respect. Doubtless its virtue as a deterrent is what
chiefly recommends a statutory insurer rule.
In connection with this branch of our subject it is interesting
to consider the possibility of municipal liability where the given
injury arises out of the activity of a municipality in repairing a
street. Back in 1910 the supreme court held a municipality re-
sponsible in tort where its employees were negligent in failing to
provide protection to travelers against excavations by some such
device as blocking off such portions of the street as were under
repair.8' Quite similar would be a dangerous condition caused by
the leaving of unguarded street repairing equipment in a street
overnight.8 2 A little further removed would be a situation in
which a truck, hauling materials to a point where street repairs
were under way, ran down a pedestrian. That sort of case is not
unlike the situation in which a street sprinkling machine, de-
signed to be driven on the left side of the street, collided with
an automobile in the course of such operation. Liability has
been imposed in the street sprinkler case.88 This happy inrohd
upon the immunity rule was, unfortunately, not supported by
convincing reasoning. The court first put the sprinkling function
on a footing with street maintenance, but it would not leave well
enough alone. It added:
"Such acts are optional, purely of a municipal or local
nature, for the comfort and convenience of its citizens, and are
not compulsory for the health, safety or welfare of society in
general."' ,
80. But there are two court of appeal cases that go far in that direction.
See Holbrook v. City of Monroe, 157 So. 566 (La. App. 1934); Robinson v.
City of Alexandria, 174 So. 681 (La. App. 1937).
81. Allen v. Town of Minden, 127 La. 403, 53 So. 666 (1910).
82. An exception of no cause or right of action to a petition alleging
merely that plaintiff's child had climbed upon an unguarded ditch-digging
machine left in the street, which was attractive to children, and fell to the
ground sustaining injuries was upheld in Bordelon v. City of Shreveport, 5
La. App. 201 (1926). The doctrine of the attractive nuisance cases was
deemed inapplicable on the facts alleged.
83. Ronaldson & Puckett Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 3 La. App. 509(1925).
84. 3 La. App. 509, 510 (1925).
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Thus we are told that the function or service is not immune
because it is optional, yet in the early street and sidewalk cases
liability was based upon a mandatory charter duty to~repair! As
for the local nature of the activity we have but to point to such
matters as the maintenance of a city hall or a fire department to
show that it is not determinative of the character of a function
for tort purposes.
What is a public way for the safe condition of' which a muni-
cipality is responsible under the rule of liability? Case materials
are meagre. We believe, however, that the simple upshot of the
matter is that the rule of civil responsibility woul4 obtain in any
case in which injury was caused by a condition in astreet or side-
walk which was both a public way" and a way "subject to the
governmental authority of the municipality.8 6 Thus, even though
there had been a dedication of a way to the public, which, under
the law, would be perfected only by formal or informal accept-
ance on the part of the municipality," acceptance would have to
be made out in order to establish governmental responsibility for
it as a public way under municipal control, and, short of that,
civil responsibility would not be grounded in coeval authority
and control.
A subordinate question relates to the physical conditions
upon which the rule of liability operates. It clearly covers the
traveled portions of streets and sidewalks. But what of the rela-
tively unused portions of the right-of-way of an unpaved street
or of the neutral ground between a sidewalk proper and a street?
We can cite no Louisiana cases involving the first type of situa-
tion but, in principle, it is not evident why the civil duty to keep
the street in repair would not cover the entire right-of-way.
Doubtless, the circumstances might'so far condition the judicial
attitude as to render the plaintiff's burden relatively greater.
In Weil v. City of Alexandria,- employees of the city had
excavated a considerable hole in the neutral ground for the pur-
pose, according to the syllabus, of effecting sidewalk repairs. The
hole was left unguarded overnight and plaintiff while walking
'85. This is an obvious point. It was raised in Tharpe v. Sibley Lake
Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144 So. 274 (La. App. 1232), but the court found
on the facts that there had been a sufficient dedication and acceptance of
the street in question to render it a public way,
86. As to want of municipal control see Harrison v. Louisiana Highway
Commission, 191 La. 839, 186 So. 854 (1939).
87. As to statutory dedication, acceptance of which is not required, see
Arkansas-Loulsiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (198).
88. 7 La. App. 387 (1028).
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along the sidewalk at night fell into the hole, presumably by
casually stepping off the pavement. Plaintiff prevailed. The text
of the opinion simply assumed without elaboration that the city
owed a pedestrian a duty in the matter: The syllabus clearly
states the duty as one to maintain the sidewalk in safe condition.
More recently the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit, in
Aucoin v. City of Baton Rouge,8" has, with reference to a much
less aggravated state of facts, come to grips with our problem
and announced, in substance, that as to a jaywalker the city's
duty ended when it provided a safe sidewalk; that it owned such
a traveler no particular duty as to the neutral ground. A lady,
who stepped into a hole of unstated size in the neutral ground
in the course of taking a short-cut across the street at night, was
denied recovery. The court made an unconvincing effort to dis-
tinguish the Weil case. Our quarrel with this case is not so much
with the decision as with the implications of the opinion. Cer-
tainly one is loathe to concede that the legal conception of a safe
sidewalk for present purposes is confined to the physically paved
walkway. The problem is one of degree that makes demands
upon judicial wisdom in administration but it seems evident to
us, by way of illustration, that a perfect pavement with an
unguarded six foot drop into a drainage ditch on one side would
not constitute a safe sidewalk and that the law should recognize
this reality.
A word should be said about the responsibility of the owner
of abutting property for the condition of a sidewalk. Quite apart
from his position as the owner of abutting property, he, like any-
one else, is plainly responsible in damages to one who is injured
due to an obstruction or other hazard that he has negligently
placed or created on or near a sidewalk.90 Since the maintenance
of the public ways is primarily a governmental responsibility,
the "abutter" cannot fairly be held accountable as such unless a
responsibility for the condition of the sidewalk has been deft-
nitely imposed upon him by statute or municipal ordinance for
the benefit of travelers.9 1
89. 171 So. 412 (La. App. 1936). See also La Groue v. City of New Orleans,
114 La. 253, 38 So. 160 (1905).
90. Clack v. Liggett Drug Co., Inc., 164 So. 482 (La. App. 1935). In Hebert
v. Badon, 167 So. 862 (La. App. 1936), plaintiff's petition was held deficient
on an exception of no cause of action because it did not relate the sidewalk
defects in question to defendants further than to allege that the defects were
in front of their property.
91. Betz v. Limongi, 46 La. Ann. 1113, 15 So. 385 (1894); Aucoin v. City
of New Orleans, 105 La. 271, 29 So. 502 (1901); McGurk v. City of Shreve-
port, 191 So. 553 (La. App. 1939), discussed in Note (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev.
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We add, in passing, that civil responsibility for the condition
of a street or sidewalk may rest upon a private party who has by
contract with a municipality obligated himself to keep a street
or other public way in repair,12 or upon one who has a permit,
license or franchise giving him some special privilege in connec-
tion with a public way.93
The fact that a private party may for one reason or another
bear civil responsibility for the condition of a public way does
not, however, absolve the municipality; its control over the pub-
lic ways, in the interest of public safety, continues and along
with it civil responsibility as in the ordinary case."
Implicit in what has been said is the notion that municipal
responsibility extends only to those using the public ways for
travel and purposes incidental to travel. This phase of the subject
466; Henrichs v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 192 So. 383 (La. App. 1940).
The point won mention, but nothing more, in Burke v. Tricalli, 124 La. 774, 50
So. 710 (1909) and Varnado v. City of Baton Rouge, 5 La. App. 238 (1926).
92. Weymouth v. City of New Orleans, 40 La. Ann. 344, 4 So. 218 (1888).
93. Ibid. When a person has by contract with a municipality assumed the
obligation of keeping a street or other public place in repair, he may be
held liable to one injured because of his failure to perform such obligation.
A person who is injured by reason of a hole next to a loose rail at a
railroad grade crossing, the maintenance of railway tracks upon the streets
having been approved by the municipality, has an action against the muni-
cipality and the railroad company in solido, independently of the company's
contractual obligation to keep in repair the streets through which the rail-
road was built. Cline v. Crescent City R.R., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851
(1889). In such a case the railroad, like anyone else who has caused a
dangerous condition in a street, may be held for resulting injury or damage.
Where, in the execution of a private building contract, the contractor
laid an iron pipe across an alley forming part of the sidewalk which tripped
and injured a pedestrian using due care, the municipality and the contractor
were held liable in solido for failure to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condi-
tion. Cole v. Central Contracting Co., 5 La. App. 513 (1927). Stern v. Davies,
128 La. 182, 54 So. 712 (1911), was a case in which recovery was had against
New Orleans and its licensee, the tenant of a building on Canal Street, by an
old man who stumbled over strips of wood placed on the sidewalk as a rest
for supports to a gallery which extended from the building over the side-
walk. The supports were placed there to make the gallery safe for Mardi
Gras parade spectators. On the testimony the method of construction was
deemed unsafe to pedestrians and the tenant was liable because he put the
obstruction there.
On the ground that a municipal corporation would itself be liable for
an injury sustained by reason of its reducing a sidewalk to a dangerous
condition, a public utility which was granted permission by a municipality
to make excavations in a sidewalk for the purpose of laying electrical
conduits, was held liable for injuries resulting from falling into an unguarded
excavation. Rock v. American Constr. Co., 120 La. 831, 45 So. 741 (1908). This
decision was reached, even though the excavation was made by an inde-
pendent contractor, on the ground that the presence of such a factor doer
not insulate one from liability where the contract requires the performance
of intrinsically dangerous work, no matter how skillfully performed.
94. See the cases cited in the preceding note and Tharpe v. Sibley Lake
Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144 So. 274 (La. App. 1932). Cf. La Groue v. City
of New Orleans, 114 La. 253, 38 So. 160 (1905).
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has not been developed by adjudication in Louisiana. We believe,
however, that this delimitation of the field of liability is patently
a rational one with good prospects of receiving judicial approba-
tion.
Judging by the reported cases the entry of a plea of con-
tributory negligence is but a regular step in the orderly develop-
ment of a tort case against a municipality based on the unsafe
condition of a public way. A form of comparative negligence
seems to be contemplated by Article 2323 of the Revised Civil
Code, at least as to property damage, but the courts have not
accepted this view of the matter. Thus a plea of contributory
negligence, if sustained, operates as a complete bar to recovery.9 5
As applied to the sidewalk and street cases, the doctrine does not
mean that a pedestrian must keep his eyes glued upon the sur-
face in front of him; he may properly assume, for example, that
a paved sidewalk does not contain holes or obstructions that
necessitate constant vigilance. 96 The matter may, of course, be
conditioned by the traveler's familiarity with the public way
upon which he is traveling and with the other public ways in
the neighborhood. Thus, contributory negligence was invoked
as a basis for denying recovery in a case where a lady, who had
been using a rough, grassgrown sidewalk daily, stepped into a
hole in the sidewalk in broad daylight and was injured.9? In sev-
eral cases the courts of appeal have sustained pleas of contribu-
tory negligence where pedestrians were injured in traveling
obviously dangerous routes where safe ones were available.98 A
critical student of the law of torts might insist that this is not a
95. The cases involving judicial acceptance of the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence are too numerous for citation. It will suffice on that score to
refer to the case of Buechner v. New Orleans, 112 La. 599, 36 So. 603 (1904)
and Moise v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 19 La. App. 703, 140 So. 505
(1932). It is interesting to observe that it was in the Buechner case that the
supreme court adopted the view that contributory negligence is an affirm-
ative defense. The doctrine of comparative negligence is discussed with
reference to the Code article in Inman v. Silver Fleet of Memphis, 175 So.
436 (La. App. 1937).
96. Holbrook v. City of Monroe, 157 So. 566 (La. App. 1934). But see
Ansley v. City of New Orleans, 168 So. 343 (La. App. 1936) and Parker v.
City of New Orleans, 1 So. (2d) 123 (La. App. 1941). The pedestrian may
not have to look down when he steps from the sidewalk to the street but
let him beware when he reaches the opposite curb.
97. Barnes v. City of New Orleans, 4 La. App. 503 (1926), cert. and review
denied June 30, 1926.
98. LeCarpentier v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 13 La. App. 113,
126 So. 248 (1930); Pepper v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
18 La. App. 257, 137 So. 610 (1931), cert. and review denied January 4, 1932;
Moise v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 19 La. App. 703, 140 So. 505
(1932).
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matter of contributory negligence but one of qualifying the duty
of the municipality. In any event, the courts do not press the
point so far as to render one chargeable with contributory negli-
gence by reason of the fact that he used a road which, although
not perfect, still might, so far as appeared, be safely used in the
exercise of ordinary care even though a safer route was avail-
able.99
Concerning Bridges
For the most part, what has been said as to streets and side-
walks is applicable to the bridge cases. Here, too, the rule of
liability does not depend upon a statutory mandate as to bridge
maintenance,100 but is a jurisprudential breakdown of the barrier
of immunity.'0 ' In one respect these cases appear to exact more
of the municipality than the street and sidewalk decisions,
although the point we have in mind would apply, in principle, to
any part of a public way made of perishable materials. We refer
to the proposition that the duties of a municipality as to the
safety of a wooden bridge may entail competent inspection at
proper intervals.' In two companion court of appeal cases the
injuries complained of occurred when two young men, crossing
the footway of a bridge, stopped and leaned on a substantial
looking wooden railing, which gave way due to decay and preci-'
pitated them into the canal below.03 The bridge had been super-
99. Hebert v. City of New Orleans, 163 So. 425 (La. App. 1935).
100. There have, of course, been cases where a charter duty was relied
upon. Lorenz v. City of New Orleans, i14 La. 802, 38 So. 549 (1905).
101. Buechner v. City of New Orleans, 112 La. 599, 86 So. 603 (1904).
Although the City of New Orleans had failed to provide guard rails or
chains to prevent pedestrians from using its bridge while being turned by
electricity and to provide an unobstructed view of the approaches for the
bridge operators, it was not held liable for the death of a ten year old
child who jumped on the bridge while it was in motion and was crushed.Cusimano v. City of New Orleans, 128 La. 565, 49 So. 195 (1909). A city was
absolved from liability for the death of a five year old child who was
drowned by slipping from a bridge into a natural drainage ditch' upon the
ground that the city was not negligent in failing to place guard rails at the
ends of the bridge as (1) it was in a safe condition tO accommodate traffic,
and (2) it was not shown that children frequented the bridge. Foreman v.City of Crowley, 143 La. 654, 79 So. 210 (1918). A municipality was subjected
to liability for injuries eaubed by its failure to barricade a bridge securely,
which resulted in the barricade being rather readily removed by travelers
thus leaving the bridge open to passage by the plaintiff, who was hurrying
to catch a street car. Collins v. City of New Orleans, 3 La. App. 299 (1925).
102. Smith v. City of New Orleans, 185 La. 980, 66 So. 319 (1914); Tharpe
v. Sibley Lake Bisteneau & Southern Ry., 144 So. 274 (La. App. 1932); Kern-
stock v. City of New Orleans, 147 So. 371 (La. App. 1938); Nuss v. City of
New Orleans, 147 So. 374 (La. App. 1933).
103. Kernstock v. City of New Orleans, 147 So. 871 (La. App. 1933); Nuso
v. City of New Orleans, 147 So. 374 (La. App. 1933).
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ficially inspected two or three months before but the court
thought that an adequate inspection would have spotted the rot-
ten state of the railing. On this basis it could be said that the city
should have known of the hazard but the court went further; it
suggested that in view of the perishable character of the struc-
ture there well might be a duty to inspect, a breach of which
would involve liability quite apart from actual notice of the
unsafe condition or the existence of facts otherwise rendering
notice non-essential. The day of wooden bridge structures is
passing but we repeat that the notion has. wider implications.
Does one who uses a bridge railing as a resting place -so far
depart from normal bridge uses as to be beyond the protection of
the rule of municipal liability? In the last-cited cases a definite
negative answer was given to this question. If the normal pro-
tection is to be confined to travelers, as we suppose,- it would
doubtless shelter uses incidental to travel, including resting
against a bridge railing. It would not cover other uses, but "what
is which" is a problem yet to be dumped into the ample lap of
the courts.
Wharves
There has been no clear judicial expression of the notion that
the maintenance and operation of wharves are so far a corporate
function as to render a municipality responsible civilly for injur-
ies or damages occasioned by defective municipal wharves.104
Doubtless that theory was in the back of the judicial mind in an
old case in which the city of New Orleans was held liable for the
value of a cargo lost by the collapse of a defective wharf at which
the cargo was being discharged from a boat. The court seized
upon the profit element; by charging and receiving wharfage
dues, the city, thought the court, assumed the obligation of pro-
viding a safe wharf. In a relatively recent case a town was held
responsible for injuries caused by the unsafe condition, known to
the town, of the floor of a dance pavilion which formed a part
of a public wharf owned and operated by it.10 5 The town was
required by its charter to keep its wharves in repair but the court
did not pin the matter down to a mandatory duty imposed by
statute.
The Independent Contractor Element
The general notion that one is not liable for the wrongful
104. Fennimore v. City of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 124 (1868).
105. Shafer v. Town of Madisonville, 18 La. App. 146, 136 So. 774 (1931),
rehearing denied 18 La. App. 154, 139 So. 733 (1931).
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conduct of his independent contractor or of the employees of the
latter has been applied to municipalities.106 The rule was applied
in a case where an incorporated board, exercising municipal func-
tions, had retained general supervision over public work, done
for it by a contractor, for the purpose of seeing to the perform-
ance of the provisions of the contract, but had no control over the
selection of employees or their work.1°7 In that case the action was
one for damages for the alleged wrongful death of an employee of
the contractor. Where, however, the municipal agency did exer-
cise control over the selection of the contractor's workmen and
over the manner of their work, the label, independent contractor,
was brushed aside and liability imposed for the negligence of the
contractor's employees.10 8 Even where the case involves a true
independent contractor situation, the idea that the interposition
of an independent contractor does not insulate from liability in
the case of characteristically dangerous work would doubtless
apply as against a municipality. 09
Ultra Vires
A general proposition of particular significance in the pro-
prietary function cases is that even where the activity is admit-
tedly of that character, the municipality will not be responsible
in tort if in exercising that function it is acting in excess of its
charter powers. In one case, for example, it was sought to recover
damages for the death of a wagon driver caused by the alleged
neglect of the defendant municipality to place guard rails on a
ferry. The city successfully relied on its want of authority to
establish and operate the ferry."0 This same idea would apply in
a case where a municipality was supplying water or electricity
beyond its corporate limits without authority. Space limitations
do not permit thorough analysis of this special branch of the sub-
ject. While the immunity has been defended,"' we find it diffi-
cult to swallow. Formalistic arguments based on the want even
of substantive power do not convince; technically, a principal
106. Todaro v. City of Shreveport, 187 La. 68, 174 So. 111 (1937); La Groue
v. City of New Orleans, 114 La. 253, 38 So. 160 (1905).
107. Lutenbacher v. Mitchell-Borne Constr. Co., 186 La. 805, 67 So. 888 (1915).
108. Quayle v. Sewerage and Water Board, 131 La. 26, 58 So. 1021 (1912).
109. For a decision not involving a municipality, see Rock v. American
Constr. Co., 120 La. 831, 45 So. 741 (1908).
110. Hoggard v. Mayor of Monroe, 51 La. Ann. 683, 25 So. 349, 44 L.R.A.
477 (1899). Where the petition showed that the act alleged to be tortious
was ultra vires, there could be no recovery, Gaudet v. Parish of Lafourche,
146 La. 863, 88 So. 653 (1920).
111. See Gettys, Municipal Liability for Ultra Vires Tortious Acts (1934)
8 Temple L. Q. 133.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
seldom authorizes an agent to commit a wrong but he will not
be heard on that score. And, on the policy question of who
should bear the risk, does anyone suppose that the hazard to the
public treasury is so great as to shift the burden from him upon
whom it otherwise should rest?
A distinction is drawn in the cases between want of power
and the irregular or improper manner of exercising a conceded
power. The cases sustain recovery against a municipality where
the action falls in the latter category. For example, liability has
been imposed where there was an illegal advertisement and dis-
posal of property lawfully seized for violation of a city ordi-
nance,1 1 2 an illegal seizure of a horse and dray by city officers
done within the scope of their employment and ratified by the
city,"' an illegal execution of a judgment in a city's favor by
which a railroad depot erected partly on a street and partly on
private property was totally demolished upon orders of the
mayor, ratified by the city council,"' an illegal demolition of pri-
vate buildings on public property pursuant to resolutions of the
town council,1 5 and an illegal seizure of merchandise and closing
of a store by the city marshall in an attempt to collect payment
of taxes due by another." 6 Needless to say, the presumption, in
such cases, is always in favor of the propriety of the conduct and
the good faith of the municipal authorities."7 It is evident that
the character of the municipal function was not controlling in
these cases.
112. Baumgard v. Mayor, 9 La. 119, 29 Am. Dec. 437 (1836). It is to be
observed that this case was decided prior to the turning point case of
Stewart v. City of New Orleans, 9 La. Ann. 461 (1854).
113. Wilde v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 15 (1857).
114. Pontchartrain R. R. v. City of New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 162 (1875).
115. Faucheux v. Town of St. Martinville, 124 La. 959, 50 So. 809 (1909).
116. Engeran v. City of Houma, 146 So. 712 (La. App. 1933), wherein the
court declared that although the function of collecting taxes is govern-
mental, it is transcended when the collector commits a trespass.
Recovery was allowed against the municipality in McGary v. City of
Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668 (La. 1846) (illegal violation of a court injunction by
mayor ratified by city council, whereby a building on private property was
demolished in the mistaken belief that it was on public land); Walling v.
Mayor of Shreveport, 5 La. Ann. 660 (1850) (improper exercise of charter
authority to lay out a public road in the city limits in that the required
legal procedure was not followed); and in McLaughlin v. Municipality No.
2, 5 La. Ann. 504 (1850) (unnecessary prolongation of expropriation proceed-
ings resulting in loss of rents). Cf. Mallard and Armistead v. the City of Laf-
ayette, 5 La. Ann. 112 (1850); Donovan v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. Ann.
711 (1856).
117. Reynolds v. Mayor and Trustees of Shreveport, 13 La. Ann. 426
(1M58); Thibodaux v. Town of Thibodeaux, 46 La. Ann. 1528, 16 So. 450 (1894).
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Lease and Bailment Cases
The City of New Orleans was treated just like a private
party under similar circumstances where it was held liable for
the value of a barge. leased for use in connection with the
removal of garbage, which was lost by sinking as a result of care-
less overloading by city employees. 118 This case is rather signifi-
cant. The governmental function business was not mentioned
although garbage removal, as we have seen, has since been
labeled governmental. The theory of the decision was simply
that the city was liable as a negligent lessee. It would apply to
any situation in which the municipality sustained a like rela-
tionship, without regard to the nature of the function in which
the property, held by it as bailee or lessee, was used.119
II. LocAL Uyrrs OTmRa THAN MUNICIPALIIE
Parishes,1 2 0 levee districts,12 1 and school boards'22 are re-
garded as governmental agencies of the state, much closer to the
bosom of the sovereign than a municipal corporation, and, as
such, have been accorded general immunity from tort liability.
The prevailing notion is that they are concerned exclusively with
performing delegated duties or functions of the sovereign,
whereas municipalities are supposed to have their own special
knitting in which only the home folks are interested. Thus, a
parish enjoys immunity even in the street, road and bridge
cases.128 The suburban dweller's chance of getting judgment for
118. Interstate Transportation Co. v. City of New Orleans, 52 La. Ann.
1859, 28 So. 310 (1900). Cf. Wilkinson v. City of Shreveport, 165 So. 471 (La.
App. 1936).
119. Chase v. Mayor, 9 La. 343 (1836); Clague v. City of New Orleans,
13 La. Ann. 275 (1858).
120. Sherman v. Parish of Vermilion, 51 La. Ann., 880, 25 So. 538 (1899).
Accord: Benton v. Parish of East Carroll, Gunby's Reports 42 (Second Cir-
cuit Court of La., 1885); Rogers v. Police Jury of East Baton Rouge, i La.
App. 648 (1925); wise v. Eubanks, 159 So. 161 (La. App. 1935). Contra: Hous-
ton v. Police Jury of St. Martin Parish, 3 La. Ann. 566 (1848), where the
police Jury was subjected to liability under the rule of respondeat superior
for Injuries sustained as a result of the failure of its employees to open its
drawbridge for passage of a boat.
121. Trumata v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans District, 3
La. App. 785 (1926). In Costa v. Illinois Central R. R., 137 La. 682, 69 So.
98 (1915), the "attractive nuisance" doctrine was held inapplicable to chil-
dren injured by striking a levee projection while stealing a ride on a freight
train. The court found that neither the railroad nor the district had breached
any duty owed the children. The immunity notion was not mentioned.
122. Horton v. Bienville Parish School Board, 4 La App. 123 (1926)
123. Bridges: King v. Police Jury of St. Landry Patish,. 12 La. Ann. 858
(1857); Bankins v. Police Jury of Calcasieu Parish, 116 La. 689, 40 So. 925
(1906); Gaudet v. Parish of Lafourche, 146 La. 368, 83 So. 652 (1920); Smith
v. Police Jury of St. Tammany Parish, 192 La. 214, 187 So. 558 (1939). Roads:
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injuries due to driving into an unguarded hole in a street may
depend entirely on whether the hole is within the city limits or
just across the line.
The notion that a parish is on a different level from a muni-
cipal corporation because it is more directly a governmental arm
of the sovereign must not have been too convincing even in years
past when the powers and functions of parishes were so far
limited that they could be more aptly described merely as admin-
istrative units of the state. Today, a Louisiana parish, to a degree
much greater than is commonly true of counties in other states,
has extensive powers and performs numerous functions of local
government. Whatever validity the distinction might have had in
years past, it is enough to say here that it has become largely a
sterile formula out of harmony with the existing governmental
and legal picture. Surely, the powers and functions and the
attendant risk are substantially parallel. The old verbal legerde-
main about a parish being a state agency and a municipality not
is no longer quicker than the discriminating legal eye. But,
beyond all this, if it be conceded that a city should be held
responsible in a street case despite the governmental character
of the function, are we to suppose that there are degrees of "gov-
ernmentalness" which make a difference as to tort responsibility?
This point applies, of course, to the levee districts and school
boards as well. If there is such a distinction it is too subtle for
us to grasp.
Drainage districts have been subjected to tort liability in two
cases of trespass upon private property.12' And it has been indi-
cated that road districts may likewise be held to such responsi-
bility.125
III. THE FACTOR OF PUBLIC LIABILITY INSURANCE
For one reason or another-to what extent altruism and to
what unfamiliarity with the law we cannot say-many munici-
See Barbee v. Road Dist. No. 1, Claiborne Parish, 14 La. App. 652, 130 So. 660
(1930); Wise v. Eubanks, 159 So. 161 (La. App. 1935).
124. Canal and Carondelet Navigation Co. v. Commissioners of the First
Drainage District of New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. -740 (1874); Taglialavore v.
Caernarvon Drainage District, 153 La. 811, 96 So. 665 (1923). These cases do
not clearly pin the basis for decision to the notion that drainage districts
are not state agencies, as distinguished from parishes, levee districts and
school boards.
125. See Wise v. Eubanks, 159 So. 161 (La. App. 1935). Cf. Barbee v
Road Dist. No. 1, Claiborne Parish, 14 La. App. 652, 130 So. 660 (1930), where
the named party defendant was a road district but the opinion was con-
cerned exclusively with the liability vel non of the police jury of the parish.
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palities and parish police juries have been carrying public lia-
bility insurance covering various activities, including some
plainly within the governmental function category. This fact,
coupled with the statute enabling the injured person or his
heirs to sue the insurer under such a policy without joining
the assured as a defendant, 12 has been seized upon by way of
making further practical constrictions of the field of immunity.
While the supreme court has not ruled on the point,'2 a pub-
lic liability insurer of a municipal corporation has been held
liable in a leading court of appeal decision, where it was admitted
that the municipality enjoyed the governmental function immu-
nity and despite the fact that the insurance contract provided
for indemnity against loss by reason of the liability imposed by
law upon the assured for damages on account of bodily injuries,
including death.1 2 8 The same position has been taken where the
assured was a parish. 20
These decisions stem from an earlier supreme court deter-
mination that, in a suit by a wife against an insurer upon an
automobile indemnity insurance policy of the husband, the plea
of coverture was personal to the husband and thus was not avail-
able to the insurer.3 0 Vigorous efforts have been made to supply
them with adequate rational support. It has been said that the
question involved is a matter of defense, consisting of immunity
from tort liability because of the engagement of the assured in
the exercise of a governmental function, which defense is purely
personal to the municipality or its agency and may not be set up
by the "surety" under Articles 2098 and 3060 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. But the supreme court has declared that no liability
in tort can arise out of the performance of governmental functions
of a city.' 31 It has held that as between the injured party and the
126. La. Act 253 of 1918, as amended by La. Act 55 of 1930 [Dart's Stats.
(1932) § 4248].
127. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice O'Neill. in
Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 181 La. 630, 160
So. 121, 122 (1935).
128. Rome v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 156 So.
64 (La. App. 1934), affirmed 181 La. 630, 160 So. 121 (1935); 169 So. 132 (La. App.
1936), overruling Loustalot v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Associa-
tion, 164 So. 183 (La. App. 1935), discussed in (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 326. See
Brooks v. Bass, 184 So. 222, 224 (La. App. 1938). In the recent case of Goudeau
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 200 So. 493 (La. App. 1941), the court
exonerated the municipality's insurer from responsibility in damages be-
cause the city was not negligent.
129. Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App. 1939).
130. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
131. Davis v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R. 155 La. 504, 99 So. 419 (1924).
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public corporation the matter is not one of defense; that the onus
is on the plaintiff to allege and prove, as essential to his cause of
action, that the injury arose from the performance of a proprie-
tary, not a governmental, function.3 2 Again, it has been urged
that the public policy behind the "defense" is aimed at preven-
tion of the diversion of public funds from the purposes to which
they are dedicated and thus does not concern the insurer because
no liability is sought to be imposed upon the public. This
asserted public policy is open to serious question. Why should
not the risk be institutionalized? If it should, would not the
financial burden be a proper charge upon the funds devoted to
the function out of the performance of which the risk arises?
Liability for torts arising from operations is an operating expense
to be accounted for as such. It has been urged, in the third
place, that to allow a paid insurer to escape liability because the
principal is not liable would accomplish a miscarriage of justice
where the public body, despite its own non-liability, has deemed
it wise to protect the public by insurance. This is aside from the,
mark because the question depends on the insurer's contract;7
which confines its responsibility to cases where the principal is'
liable. Finally, it has been said that not to hold the insurer would
put him in the position of having received public moneys without
consideration and that it is against public policy to allow the
insurer to escape liability on that ground. It is not evident what
standing the injured person would have to rely on such matters.
These decisions are highly to be commended insofar as they
recognize that the injured party should have some redress and
are in line with the underlying thesis of this paper that the
responsibility of local governmental units should be broadened.
But they create a needlessly illogical legal imbroglio. It is not
flattering to our jurisprudence that, notwithstanding the enor-
mous expansion of the activities of government and the risks to
persons and property that attend them, our courts have to resort
to such reasoning to provide a measure of redress to the individ-
ual. In Louisiana, as we have seen, the law was more advanced
a century ago.1 8
IV. NuIsANcEs
Another special type of case deserving of mention is that
involving the maintenance of a nuisance. There appears to be
132. West Monroe Mfg. Co. v. Town of West Monroe, 146 La. 641, 83
So. 881 (1920).
183. See the cases cited supra notes 12 and 13.
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no case in which a municipality or other local unit has been sub-
jected to civil liability, but there would seem every reason to say
that the supreme court would, as to property damage at least,
treat a municipality much in the same way that it would an
offending private property owner.'3 ' Were the court to follow the
lead of some of our sister states recovery for personal injury
would be denied.3 5 We leave it to the reader to pass upon the
reason and justice of such a distinction. Possibly historical con-
siderations associated with the sanctity of private property lie
behind the apparent judicial disposition to hold the govern-
mental unit responsible more freely in the nuisance than the
negligence cases.
V. EXPROPRLATION
Under the constitutional inhibition against the taking or
damaging of private property except for public purposes and
after just and adequate compensation is paid,18 an action may bie
maintained against any local unit of government which proceeds
with actual expropriation without first making such Compensa-
tion.' s The same principles are applied in actions against agencies
or departments of the- state government.138  It has even been
134. Whether substitutional redress would be available was a matter left
open in Gibson v. City of Baton Rouge. 161 La. 637, 109 So. 339, 47 A.L.R.
1151 (1926), where injunctive relief was denied on a balancing of equities.
But the court declared that municipalities are no more privileged to main-
tain public nuisances than are private parties and made it clear that a
nuisance so maintained is wrongful. Cf. Howe v. City of New Orleans, 12 La.
Ann. 481 (1857).
135. See Borchard, supra note 1, at 34 Yale L. 3. 251, and cases cited.
But see 6 McQuillin, op. cit. supra note 40, at § 2812, n. 46.
136. La. Const. of 1921, Art. 1, 12.
137. Lalanne v. Savoy, 29 La. Ann. 516 (1877); Manning v. City of
Shreveport, 119 La. 1044, 44 So. 882 (1907); Foster v. City of New Orleans,
155 La. 889, 99 So. 686 (1924); DeMoss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish. 167
La. 83, 118 So. 700, 68 A.L.R. 336 (1928), reversing 9 La. App. 215, 120 So. 137
(1928); Nagle v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So. 425 (1932).
See Avery v. Police Jury of Tbervilie, 12 La. Ann. 554,557 (1857). In Millspaugh
v. City of New Orleans, 20 La. Ann. 323 (1868), where the city had wrong-
fully appropriated stone ballast for use in repairing its streets, liability was
predicated upon tort under Art. 2294, La. Civil Code of 1825 (Art. 2315, La.
Civil Code of 1870). Might not the basis for the decision have been that of
expropriation for a public purpose?
138. Booth v. Louisiana Highway Commission, 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169
(1931); Siebert v. Conservation Commission of Louisiana, 181 La. 237, 159 Sd.
375 (1935); Cope v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 176 So. 657
(La. App. 1937); Pelt v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 178 So.
644 (La. App. 1938). If, however, the damages involved are conjectural,
purely consequential in nature, or impossible of accurate determination until
after the accomplishment of the public purpose of the expropriation, an
injunction Iill not be granted. Kuhn v. Louisiana Highway Commission,
174 La. 990, 142 So. 149 (1932). Cf. Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Commi-i.
sion, 191 La. 839, 186. So. 354 (1939).
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determined that express statutory consent to suit against the state
agency or department is not necessary since the constitutional
provision is considered "self-executing."'189 Also predicated upon
special constitutional limitations14 0 and likewise forming a class
by themselves are those decisions imposing liability upon levee
districts where private property had been used or destroyed in
constructing levee works.' 4 '
VI. LIABITy To EMPLOYEES
There appears to be little helpful material on this subject
apart from the Employers' Liability Act and the cases interpret-
ing it.
There is an old case rather obscure as to the facts, in which
police officers were wounded while on duty.142 They were denied
recovery against the city. The court said that the risk was one
assumed when they accepted the positions. In a later case dam-
ages were recovered for the death of a youth employed at a
municipal electric plant who was killed while on the job.14 The
report is barren of reference to the possible immunity of the
town. The petition necessarily revealed the "proprietary" char-
acter of the function and the town apparently did not set up a
claim of immunity. As a general proposition, we see no adequate
basis for refusing to impose civil responsibility upon a public
employer for the protection of its employees on substantially the
same footing as private employers. The application of the Em-
ployers' Liability Act to governmental units is statutory con-
firmation of this view.
Under the Louisiana Employers' Liability Act persons injured
while in the service "of any parish, township, incorporated vil-
lage or city, or other political subdivision, or incorporated public
board or commission" in Louisiana "authorized by law to hold
property and to sue and be sued, under any appointment or con-
tract of hire, express or implied, oral or written," except an
"official" of such governmental units or agencies, are entitled to
139. Cope v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 176 So. 657
(La. App. 1937); Pelt v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 178 So.
644 (La. App. 1938).
140. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XVI, §6.
141. Koerber v. Orleans Levee Board, 51 La. Ann. 523, 25 So. 415 (1899);
52 La. Ann. 2110, 28 So. 318 (1900); Green v. Beard of Com'rs of Lake Borgne
Basin Levee District, 163 La. 117, 111 So. 619 (1927); McGeehan v. Board
of Levee Com'rs, 165 La. 241, 115 So. 473 (1928). See DeMoss v. Police Jury of
Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700, 68 A.L.R. 336 (1928).
142. Spalding v. City of Jefferson, 27 La. Ann. 159 (1875).
143. Bonnin v. Town of Crowley, 112 La. 1025, 36 So. 842 (1904).
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compensation."' The term "political subdivision," as used in the
act, has been interpreted to include a parish school board 45 and a
road district. 46 It was undoubtedly the statutory intention to
cover local governmental units generally. It is evident from this
that the act, for its purpose, obliterates the governmental versus
proprietary distinction.
Liability under the act is not conditioned upon the activities
of the public employer being hazardous in nature."7 Under cer-
tain provisions of the act the principal is rendered liable as if the
employee were employed by him where he is undertaking to
execute any work which is a part of his business and has con-
tracted with another person for the performance of the work by
that person. Significantly, these provisions have been held appli-
cable to public agencies with respect to the performance of work
of a hazardous nature which is of a character essential to their
business.148 The court arrived at this conclusion after ruling that
the employee of the contractor was not an employee of the pub-
lic agency within the meaning of the primary provisions of the
act.149
To be compensable, the injury must have arisen out of and
in the course of the complainant's employment."50 Where the
employment is in the service of a municipal carrier by railroad
engaged in interstate commerce the liability of the governmental
unit is, it has been held, governed exclusively by the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.151 This was true, regardless of whether
the municipal function was governmental or proprietary, because
the field was one in which federal power was supreme.
Viewed in the perspective of the cases, the exception of
officials from the operation of the act renders its application too
narrow. The term "official" has been deemed to include a police-
144. La. Act 20 of 1914, §1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §4391].
145. Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938).
146. Hicks v. Parish of Union, 6 La. App. 543 (1927). As to what are
political subdivisions of the state, see Note (1939) 1 LOUISINA LAW REvisw 626.
147. Charity Hospital of Louisiana v. Board of School Directors of St.
Martin Parish, 146 So. 487 (La. App. 1933); Kroncke v. Caddo Parish School
Board, 183 So. 86 (La. App. 1938).
148. Washington v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 180 So.
199 (La. App. 1938), cert. denied May 30, 1938.
149. For a case in which the claimant himself was held to be an inde-
pendent contractor and thus within the provision of the act excepting in-
dependent contractors from its operation, see Rodgers v. City of Hammond,
178 So. 732 (La. App. 1938).
150. Ford v. City of Alcxandria, 155 So. 48 (La. App. 1934).
151. Higglnbotham v. Public Belt Railroad Commission, 181 So. 65, 221
(La. App. 1938), affirmed 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1939).
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man 1 2 and a municipal watchman,"" whose particular 'responsi-
bilities were regarded as duties of a peace officer. The policeman
was considered an appointive "officer" within the meaning of the
city charter and that term was deemed synonymous with "offi-
cial" as used in the act. In the case of the watchman, stress was
laid upon the nature of the claimant's duties. These decisions
certainly suggest the advisability of an amendment to the statute
that would broaden its coverage in the case where a public
agency is the employer. "'
CONCLUSION
As the reader will have observed, the foregoing pages present
a mixture of exposition and critical comment. We have tried to
set out the legal material fully and accurately but we have not
spared criticism where we thought it was due. We believe that
we have made it clear that the law governing the responsibility
in tort of local units of government in Louisiana is on anything
but a satisfactory basis at the present time.
If a thorough job of rewriting the law on the subject were
undertaken it should strike at the theoretical root of all the
trouble, namely, the notion of sovereign immunity which places
the sovereign above the law and this in a democratic society
where government is supposed to be simply the servant of the
people, not the master. But as a practical matter we do not have
to go this far to put the law on a sounder, more wholesome basis
as to local units of government. It is a routine matter for the
laws providing for the organization of such units to grant them
capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, without the interposition of
the legislature, the courts could repudiate the immunity rule and
152. Hall v. City of Shreveport, 157 La. 589, 102 So. 680 (1925).
153. Coleman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 176 So. 143 (La. App. 1937).
154. In the cases of at least two branches of the state service, the
National Guard and the State Police, the coverage has been, in terms,
greatly extended by the legislature. See La. Act 164 of 1940, §39 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 4505.39] (National Guard); La. Act 94 of 1936, §13 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 9307.131 (State Police). It remains to be seen, however,
whether such statutory extensions provide an effective remedy. Conceding
that recovery could be obtained from the workmen's compensation insurer
in these instances, are the above provisions and those of the Employers'
Liability Act (La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391]) constitu-
tional es applied to the state departments in which these two branches of
the state service have been placed? Article III, Section 35, of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921 requires that the legislature shall provide for the method
of procedure and the effect of the judgment when it shall authorize suits
against the state. Quaere whether an action could be maintained against
either of these state departments in view of the apparent omission of the
legislature to comply with these constitutional requirements.
[Vol. III
1941] LOCAL GOVERNMENT TORT RESPONSIBILITY 755
hold the tort articles of the Revised Civil Code applicable to local
units of government.
But, despite the vagaries of the governmental versus proprie-
tary distinction, the immunity notion is so strongly entrenched
in the jurisprudence of the state that the prospect for judicial
repudiation is not too bright.
We would, accordingly, commend the subject as one deserv-
ing of prompt legislative consideration and action. The legislature
would be in a position to consider such important practical
aspects of the matter as how to meet any additional financial bur-
den that would be entailed and how to safeguard the public purse
from imposition and fraud. It is our thought, moteover, that it
would be practically indispensable to the intelligent formulation
of legislative policy with respect to the subject that a careful
study first be made of its practical aspects.155 Once the fruits of
such a study were available it could be determined sensibly to
what extent the primary rule of liability should be qualified to
meet special problems or should be hedged about with procedural
and administrative safeguards. The next regular session of the
legislature is a year ahead; there is time in the interim for the
making of the basic factual study under the aegis of competent
authority.
155. Comparative materials should be consulted. A helpful list of refer-
ences to legal commentaries on the general subject may be found in Borch-
ard, State and Municipal Liebility in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform (1934)
20 A.B.J. 747, 748, n. 1. At the' end of that paper Professor Borchard set
out a tentative draft of a statute relating to the settlement of tort claims
against the state as well as local units.
Statistical studies of the administration of municipal tort liability have
been undertaken in geographically representative cities and some of them
have been completed. For references to available materials of this sort see
Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 437, and the Symposium on Municipal Tort Liability (1940) 5 Legal
Notes on Local Government 851.
